Purpose This study aims to explore how the public perceives the effectiveness of surveillance technology, and how people’s views on privacy and their views on effectiveness are related. Likewise, it looks at the relation between perceptions of effectiveness and opinions on the acceptable cost of surveillance technology. Design/methodology/approach For this study, surveys of Dutch students and their parents were conducted over three consecutive years. Findings A key finding of this paper is that the public does not engage in a trade-off (...) neither with regard to privacy-effectiveness nor with effectiveness-cost, but rather expects all three elements to be achieved simultaneously. This paper also found that the correlation between perceived effectiveness and perceived privacy was stronger for parents than for students. Research limitations/implications Participants for this study were exclusively in The Netherlands. Survey questions on the effectiveness of surveillance technology focused on one type of technology, and on private mobile device use in two scenarios. Social implications The public’s perceptions of the effectiveness of surveillance technology potentially influence its acceptance of the technology, which, in turn, can affect the legitimacy and use of the technology. Originality/value Within the much-discussed privacy-security debate lies a less-heard debate – that of the effectiveness of the surveillance technology in question. The public is one actor in this debate. This study examines the public’s perceptions of this less-heard debate. (shrink)

The presence of general intelligence poses a major evolutionary puzzle, which has led to increased interest in its presence in nonhuman animals. The aim of this review is to critically evaluate this question and to explore the implications for current theories about the evolution of cognition. We first review domain-general and domain-specific accounts of human cognition in order to situate attempts to identify general intelligence in nonhuman animals. Recent studies are consistent with the presence of general intelligence in mammals (rodents (...) and primates). However, the interpretation of a psychometricgfactor as general intelligence needs to be validated, in particular in primates, and we propose a range of such tests. We then evaluate the implications of general intelligence in nonhuman animals for current theories about its evolution and find support for the cultural intelligence approach, which stresses the critical importance of social inputs during the ontogenetic construction of survival-relevant skills. The presence of general intelligence in nonhumans implies that modular abilities can arise in two ways, primarily through automatic development with fixed content and secondarily through learning and automatization with more variable content. The currently best-supported model, for humans and nonhuman vertebrates alike, thus construes the mind as a mix of skills based on primary and secondary modules. The relative importance of these two components is expected to vary widely among species, and we formulate tests to quantify their strength. (shrink)

This paper concludes a special feature of Sustainability Science that explores a broad range of social value theoretical traditions, such as religious studies, social psychology, indigenous knowledge, economics, sociology, and philosophy. We introduce a novel transdisciplinary conceptual framework that revolves around concepts of 'lenses' and 'tensions' to help navigate value diversity. First, we consider the notion of lenses: perspectives on value and valuation along diverse dimensions that describe what values focus on, how their sociality is envisioned, and what epistemic and (...) procedural assumptions are made. We characterise fourteen of such dimensions. This provides a foundation for exploration of seven areas of tension, between: (1) the values of individuals vs collectives; (2) values as discrete and held vs embedded and constructed; (3) value as static or changeable; (4) valuation as descriptive vs normative and transformative; (5) social vs relational values; (6) different rationalities and their relation to value integration; (7) degrees of acknowledgment of the role of power in navigating value conflicts. In doing so, we embrace the 'mess' of diversity, yet also provide a framework to organise this mess and support and encourage active transdisciplinary collaboration. We identify key research areas where such collaborations can be harnessed for sustainability transformation. Here it is crucial to understand how certain social value lenses are privileged over others and build capacity in decision-making for understanding and drawing on multiple value, epistemic and procedural lenses. (shrink)

This paper concludes a special feature of Sustainability Science that explores a broad range of social value theoretical traditions, such as religious studies, social psychology, indigenous knowledge, economics, sociology, and philosophy. We introduce a novel transdisciplinary conceptual framework that revolves around concepts of ‘lenses’ and ‘tensions’ to help navigate value diversity. First, we consider the notion of lenses: perspectives on value and valuation along diverse dimensions that describe what values focus on, how their sociality is envisioned, and what epistemic and (...) procedural assumptions are made. We characterise fourteen of such dimensions. This provides a foundation for exploration of seven areas of tension, between: (1) the values of individuals vs collectives; (2) values as discrete and held vs embedded and constructed; (3) value as static or changeable; (4) valuation as descriptive vs normative and transformative; (5) social vs relational values; (6) different rationalities and their relation to value integration; (7) degrees of acknowledgment of the role of power in navigating value conflicts. In doing so, we embrace the ‘mess’ of diversity, yet also provide a framework to organise this mess and support and encourage active transdisciplinary collaboration. We identify key research areas where such collaborations can be harnessed for sustainability transformation. Here it is crucial to understand how certain social value lenses are privileged over others and build capacity in decision-making for understanding and drawing on multiple value, epistemic and procedural lenses. (shrink)

Background: Dementia care at home often involves decisions in which the caregiver must weigh safety concerns with respect for autonomy. These dilemmas can lead to situations where caregivers provide care against the will of persons living with dementia, referred to as involuntary treatment. To prevent this, insight is needed into how family caregivers of persons living with dementia deal with care situations that can lead to involuntary treatment. Objective: To identify and describe family caregivers’ experiences regarding care decisions for situations (...) that can lead to involuntary treatment use in persons living with dementia at home. Research design: A qualitative descriptive interview design. Data were analysed using the Qualitative Analysis Guide of Leuven. Participants and research context: A total of 10 family caregivers providing care for 13 persons living with dementia participated in in-depth semi-structured interviews. Participants were recruited by registered nurses via purposive sampling. Ethical consideration: The study protocol was approved by the Ethics Committee of the University Hospitals Leuven and the Medical Ethical Test Committee Zuyderland. Findings: Family caregivers experience the decision-making process concerning care dilemmas that can lead to involuntary treatment as complicated, stressful and exhausting. Although they consider safety and autonomy as important values, they struggle with finding the right balance between them. Due to the progressive and unpredictable nature of dementia, they are constantly seeking solutions while they adapt to new situations. Family caregivers feel responsible and experience social pressure for the safety of persons living with dementia. They may be blamed if something adverse happens to the persons living with dementia, which increases an already stressful situation. Their experience is influenced by characteristics of the care triad such as practical and emotional support, knowledge, and previous experiences. Discussion and conclusion: To prevent involuntary treatment, professionals need to proactively inform family caregivers, and they need to support each other in dealing with complex care situations. (shrink)

Pancreatitis is a complex, progressively destructive inflammatory disorder. Alcohol was long thought to be the primary causative agent, but genetic contributions have been of interest since the discovery that rare PRSS1, CFTR and SPINK1 variants were associated with pancreatitis risk. We now report two associations at genome-wide significance identified and replicated at PRSS1-PRSS2 and X-linked CLDN2 through a two-stage genome-wide study. The PRSS1 variant likely affects disease susceptibility by altering expression of the primary trypsinogen gene. The CLDN2 risk allele is (...) associated with atypical localization of claudin-2 in pancreatic acinar cells. The homozygous CLDN2 genotype confers the greatest risk, and its alleles interact with alcohol consumption to amplify risk. These results could partially explain the high frequency of alcohol-related pancreatitis in men. © 2012 Nature America, Inc. All rights reserved. (shrink)

Background: Notwithstanding near-universal agreement on the theoretical importance of truthfulness, empirical research has documented gaps between ethical norms and physician behaviors. Although prior research has explored situations in which physicians may not be truthful with patients, it has focused on contexts within specialty practice. In this article, we report on a qualitative study of truthfulness in primary care. Methods: We conducted a qualitative study during December 2014–March 2015 involving both focus groups and in-depth, semistructured interviews with 32 primary care physicians (...) from the Boston, MA, and Baltimore, MD, metro areas in three specialties: internal medicine, family practice, and pediatrics. Interviews and focus groups were led using a semistructured guide, which explored situations in which primary care physicians find it difficult to be honest with patients; factors shaping truthfulness; and rationales for truthful and untruthful communication. Results: While physicians described outright lying to patients as rare, other deviations from truthfulness were not uncommon, including slanting and deliberately withholding information. Physicians described a range of factors as influencing truthfulness, from patient-level characteristics such as educational background to societal considerations including avoiding unnecessary tests and procedures. Physicians described truthfulness as an ethical requirement, deviations from which required further justification. Perceived justifications included promoting patient well-being and avoiding harm. Conclusions: Our results suggest a potential need to augment opportunities for training in “everyday ethics” challenges, such as the appropriateness of deception in response to patient requests for inappropriate tests or pain medications. Furthermore, they indicate that, in various circumstances encountered in primary care, physicians perceive other moral duties as potentially in conflict with the duty of truthfulness. Further ethical analysis should focus on identifying when deviations from complete truthfulness do and do not serve patients' interests, to guide physicians in striking a reasonable balance among principles of medical ethics that may conflict with one another. (shrink)

Objective: Ethical guidelines are designed to ensure benefits, protection and respect of participants in clinical research. Clinical trials must now be registered on open-access databases and provide details on ethical considerations. This systematic survey aimed to determine the extent to which recently registered clinical trials report the use of standard of care and post-trial obligations in trial registries, and whether trial characteristics vary according to setting. Methods: We selected global randomized trials registered on http://www.clinicaltrials.gov and http://www.controlled-trials.com. We searched for intervention (...) trials of HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis from 9 October 2004, the date of the most recent version of the Helsinki Declaration, to 10 April 2007. Results: We collected data from 312 trials. Fifty-eight percent (58%, 95% CI = 53 to 64) of trial protocols report informed consent. Fifty-eight percent (58%, 95% CI = 53 to 64) of trials report active controls. Almost no trials (1%, 95% CI = 0.5 to 3) mention post-trial provisions. Most trials measure surrogate outcomes. Twenty percent (20%, 95% CI = 16 to 25) of trials measure patient-important outcomes, such as death; and the odds that these outcomes are in a low income country are five times greater than for a developed country (odds ratio (OR) 5.03, 95% CI = 2.70 to 9.35, p = < 0.001). Pharmaceutical companies are involved in 28% (CI = 23 to 33) of trials and measure surrogate outcomes more often than nonpharmaceutical companies (OR 2.45, 95% CI = 1.18 to 5.09, p = 0.31). Conclusion: We found a large discrepancy in the quality of reporting and approaches used in trials in developing settings compared to wealthier settings. (shrink)

BackgroundThe ARRIVE (Animal Research: Reporting of In Vivo Experiments) guidelines are widely endorsed but compliance is limited. We sought to determine whether journal-requested completion of an ARRIVE checklist improves full compliance with the guidelines.MethodsIn a randomised controlled trial, manuscripts reporting in vivo animal research submitted to PLOS ONE (March–June 2015) were randomly allocated to either requested completion of an ARRIVE checklist or current standard practice. Authors, academic editors, and peer reviewers were blinded to group allocation. Trained reviewers performed outcome adjudication (...) in duplicate by assessing manuscripts against an operationalised version of the ARRIVE guidelines that consists 108 items. Our primary outcome was the between-group differences in the proportion of manuscripts meeting all ARRIVE guideline checklist subitems.ResultsWe randomised 1689 manuscripts (control: n = 844, intervention: n = 845), of which 1269 were sent for peer review and 762 (control: n = 340; intervention: n = 332) accepted for publication. No manuscript in either group achieved full compliance with the ARRIVE checklist. Details of animal husbandry (ARRIVE subitem 9b) was the only subitem to show improvements in reporting, with the proportion of compliant manuscripts rising from 52.1 to 74.1% (X2 = 34.0, df = 1, p = 2.1 × 10−7) in the control and intervention groups, respectively.ConclusionsThese results suggest that altering the editorial process to include requests for a completed ARRIVE checklist is not enough to improve compliance with the ARRIVE guidelines. Other approaches, such as more stringent editorial policies or a targeted approach on key quality items, may promote improvements in reporting. (shrink)

Ronny Desmet & Michel Weber (edited by), Whitehead. The Algebra of Metaphysics. Applied Process Metaphysics Summer Institute Memorandum, Louvain-la-Neuve, Les Éditions Chromatika, 2010. (978-2-930517-08-7 ; 378 p. ; 40 € ; ) Drawing upon the major Harvard works —Science and the Modern World (1925), Process and Reality (1929) and Adventures of Ideas (1933)—, the essays gathered here on the occasion of the creation of the Applied Process Metaphysics Summer Institute, seek, first, to introduce into Whitehead’s thought by clarifying what is (...) at stake in his philosophy and by providing a synoptic vision of his key categories in light of their historical development and, second, to foster a creative dialogue among all participants. These essays give the opportunity to travel through most aspects of Whitehead’s legacy: anthropology, ecology, education, epistemology, metaphysics, psychology, political theory and relativity physics. Ronny Desmet holds an M.A. in mathematics (1983), an M.A. and a Ph.D. in philosophy (2005 and 2010). He is currently research assistant at the Centre of Logic and Philosophy of Science, Free University of Brussels. His research and publications have focused on Whitehead’s philosophy of mathematics and relativity. Michel Weber holds an M.A. and a Ph.D. in philosophy (1991 and 1997). He is the director of the Centre for Philosophical Practice “Chromatiques whiteheadiennes.” He has published more than 50 books, e.g., Whitehead’s Pancreativism. The Basics (2006) and the Handbook of Whiteheadian Process Thought (2008). (shrink)

D. Feissel-M. Sève, Inscriptions de Macédoine. P. 449-466 A partir de la collection d'estampages de l'École française et d'autres documents conservés dans ses archives, publication de 25 inscriptions inédites ou insuffisamment connues. Ces textes, des épitaphes pour la plupart, proviennent de Verria (n08 1 à 3), Edessa (n° 4), Sindos (n° 5), Thessalonique (n08 6 à 19, les n°e 15 à 19 étant inédits), Langada (n° 20), la Chalcidique (n°e 21 à 25).

We give syntactic characterizations of1. the theories whose categories of models are closed under the formation of pullbacks, and of2. the locally ω-polypresentable categories.A somewhat typical example is the category of algebraically closed fields. Case is proved by classical model-theoretic methods; it solves a problem raised by H. Volger . The solution of case is in the spirit of the ones for the locally ω-presentable and ω-multipresentable cases found by M. Coste and P.T. Johnstone respectively. The problem was raised in (...) the context of Domain Theory by F. Lamarche. (shrink)

Philosophers writing on moral responsibility inherit from P.F. Strawson a particular problem space. On one side, it is shaped by consequentialist accounts of moral criticism on which blame is justified, if at all, by its efficacy in influencing future behavior in socially desirable ways. It is by now a common criticism of such views that they suffer a "wrong kind of reason" problem. When blame is warranted in the proper way, it is natural to suppose this is because the target (...) deserves blame – thus opposing to consequentialist views of blame desert-based views. The latter, however, raise worries that blame is a form of retributive sanction whose justificatory burdens cannot be met. I evaluate T.M. Scanlon's recent attempt to maneuver this space. In doing so, I argue that although Scanlon’s relationship-impairment model of blame has clear advantages over consequentialist and desert-based alternatives, it fails: (1) to adequately appreciate the significance of person-focused emotional attitudes in constituting persons as agents subject to a nexus of normative expectations and demands, and (2) to recognize that a victim may owe nearly nothing *to* a blameworthy agent while nonetheless retaining unconditional moral obligations to act in certain ways (and forego acting in other ways) toward him. (shrink)

Ce texte a déjà paru dans A. Caputo & M. Bracco, Nietzsche e la poesia, Bari, Stilo Editrice, 2012, p. 75-115. Nous remercions Michele Bracco de nous l'avoir adressé. Il tema della poesia e del ritmo impegna Nietzsche fin dai primi anni della sua carriera di filologo. Risalgono al semestre invernale 1875-1876 alcune lezioni tenute all'università di Basilea sulla storia della letteratura greca nelle quali l'origine della poesia viene spiegata a partire dalla sua relazione col ritmo, (...) - Philosophie (...) – Nouvel article. (shrink)

In a previous work (M. Campisi. Stud. Hist. Phil. M. P. 36 (2005) 275-290) we have addressed the mechanical foundations of equilibrium thermodynamics on the basis of the Generalized Helmholtz Theorem. It was found that the volume entropy provides a good mechanical analogue of thermodynamic entropy because it satisfies the heat theorem and it is an adiabatic invariant. This property explains the ``equal'' sign in Clausius principle ($S_f \geq S_i$) in a purely mechanical way and suggests that the volume entropy (...) might explain the ``larger than'' sign (i.e. the Law of Entropy Increase) if non adiabatic transformations were considered. Based on the principles of microscopic (quantum or classical) mechanics here we prove that, provided the initial equilibrium satisfy the natural condition of decreasing ordering of probabilities, the expectation value of the volume entropy cannot decrease for arbitrary transformations performed by some external sources of work on a insulated system. This can be regarded as a rigorous quantum mechanical proof of the Second Law. We discuss how this result relates to the Minimal Work Principle and improves over previous attempts. The natural evolution of entropy is towards larger values because the natural state of matter is at positive temperature. Actually the Law of Entropy Decrease holds in artificially prepared negative temperature systems. (shrink)

Dépositaire d’une partie des textes écrits par S. Weil à propos de la pensée grecque,son ami le P. J.-M. Perrin les publia sous le titre « Intuitions pré-chrétiennes ». Ce titre inscrit l’approche de la pensée grecque par S. Weil dans une perspective téléologique conformeà une apologétique héritée des Pères de l’Église, mais étrangère à la pensée de S. Weil.Pour elle, bien loin que la révélation chrétienne vienne accomplir ce qui n’était présentqu’en germe chez les Grecs, la vérité en était (...) déjà pleinement connue de ces derniers, commede bien d’autres civilisations disparues. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Gender Ideology and the “Artistic” Fabrication of Human Sex: Nature as Norm or the Remaking of the Human?Michele M. SchumacherUntil quite recently,” the famous English novelist C. S. Lewis remarked in 1959, “it was taken for granted that the business of the artist was to delight and instruct his public”: that is to say, to address simultaneously their passions and their intellects. “There were, of course, different publics.... (...) And an artist might lead his public on to appreciate finer things than they had wanted at first; but he could do this only by being; from the first, if not merely entertaining, yet entertaining, and if not completely intelligible, yet very largely intelligible.” This constraint—let us call it intelligent (or purposeful) design, in keeping with a basic analogy that we will draw upon in these pages—had however been lost, Lewis observed. Hence, even “in the highest aesthetic circles one now hears nothing about the artist’s duty to us. It is all about our duty to him. He owes us nothing; we owe him ‘recognition,’ even though he has never paid the slightest attention to our tastes, interests, or habits.”1 In short, the artist of modernity need not pay the slightest attention to an intention, not even his own. Modern art need not be an expression of intelligence or [End Page 363] understanding; it is expression as such (tout court): personal and autonomous.2Lewis’s remarks do not point merely to the increasingly relativist tendencies of art in the Western world, to the lack of objective criteria or norms governing the artistic disciplines. They also point to the growing disregard among artists for the sociocultural expectations of their publicum. Mediating between the two is, without a doubt, the basis upon which both artistic and social norms were traditionally founded: nature, which served as a classic analogy for both art (understood in the broad sense, so as to include not only the fine arts, but also technology and practical sciences) and ethics in virtue of nature’s intrinsic inclination towards its defining end and perfection.With regard to the first of these analogies (that of art and nature), Mark Schiefsky explains that although art does bring about “results that nature itself cannot,” it does so in the classic understanding “by acting in a natural way—the way nature would act if it could generate the products of art.”3 As for the difference between the two, nature is moved to its specifying end by way of intrinsic inclinations that are implicit to it, whereas a work of art is moved to its end extrinsically, and thus with more or less violence.4 A sculptor, for example, who introduces a form into a piece of marble, does so by chiseling [End Page 364] and hammering away at the fine stone.5 “Art is,” Aristotle explains, “the principle and form of the thing that comes to be [let us say, a sculpture]; but it is located elsewhere [in, for example, the artist’s mind or in a sketch that he has made] than in that thing, whereas the movement of nature is located in the thing itself that comes to be [a tree, for example, or a baby], and is derived from another natural organism [a tree or human parents] which possessed the form in actuality.”6This classic distinction between art and nature parallels the distinction between art and ethics. Ethics “does not affect human action in the same way as do art and technique,” Servais Pinckaers explains. Unlike art and technique, which are concerned with “the external work produced by human action”—this painting or that machine, for example—ethics is concerned with an immanent principle, qualifying the actor as such: the stable dispositions (or habitus: virtues or vices) at the origin of “the active willing that is the principle source of the action.”7 This immanent principle at the source of ethical action is—to complete our analogy—creative in only a limited sense. The human person is indeed free to choose, but he or she is not free to decide “what is good or evil” as such, nor what is “good or bad for... (shrink)

P.F. Strawson’s theory of moral responsibility remains eminently influential. However, moral philosophers such as G. Watson and T.M. Scanlon have called into question it explanatory basis, which grounds moral responsibility in human nature and interpersonal relationships. They demand a deeper normative explanation for when it is appropriate to modify or mollify the reactive attitudes. In this paper, following A. Sneddon, I argue that the best interpretation of Strawson is an externalistic one which construes moral responsibility as an interpersonal social competence, (...) as this approach uniquely satisfies Strawson’s demand that we justify the reactive attitudes from within the participant perspective. I then show that this is the only interpretation capable of preserving Strawson’s well-known excuse of being peculiarly unfortunate in one’s formative circumstances. (shrink)

H. Baayen (désormais HB) a publié récemment, généralement en partenariat, de nombreux articles importants en statistique linguistique, sur la notion de productivité morphologique tout particulièrement [Baayen et al., 2000 ; Baayen & Schreuder, 2000] L'ouvrage de synthèse qu'il présente est une étude statistique approfondie des distributions des fréquences des mots. A travers ce sujet clairement affiché dans le titre mais à première vue rebattu, HB semble, au moins pour les distributions des m..

Among the distinguished contributors to the series are fellows of the Institute, past and present, Leonard E. Boyle, Jocelyn Hillgarth, Edouard Jeauneau, James K. McConica, M. Michèle Mulchahey, Joseph Owens, Walter H. Principe, James P. ...

H. Baayen (désormais HB) a publié récemment, généralement en partenariat, de nombreux articles importants en statistique linguistique, sur la notion de productivité morphologique tout particulièrement [Baayen et al., 2000 ; Baayen & Schreuder, 2000] L'ouvrage de synthèse qu'il présente est une étude statistique approfondie des distributions des fréquences des mots. A travers ce sujet clairement affiché dans le titre mais à première vue rebattu, HB semble, au moins pour les distributions des m...

My hope has been to persuade readers that Hobbes's mighty thought experiment of the state of nature distorts our conceptual learning because it ignores the second morality. Instead, it inflates the first morality as the whole of morality. This inflation arises from Hobbes's exclusive preoccupation with universalizable reason. As important as universal reason undeniably is, it does not encompass the whole of moral reality. To suppose that it does is to distort moral reality. Like so many Enlightenment figures, Hobbes would (...) have political theory be more like logic than life.To refer once again to the Enlightenment allows me to observe that the drive to universality through reason is a distinctive feature of European civilization. To proceed along this line might lead to the conclusion that the pursuit of the universal is a cultural artifact. It is itself culturally relative. I am in no position to argue that point here at the end of the day, but did not the universal criteria propounded by the Enlightenment prove serviceable in the justification of European imperialism? By the universal standards of the Enlightenment only Europe was civilized.Reason is often a weapon. Alasdair MacIntyre has termed the search for rationality in moral philosophy a masquerade. MacIntyre sees the quest for rationality to be a quest for authority. He cites John Maynard Keynes's observations that “in practice, victory [in moral argument] was with those who could speak with the greatest appearance of clear, undoubting conviction and could best use the accents of infallibility.” Rationality is a weapon. “In moral argument the apparent assertion of principles functions as a mask for expressions of personal preference.” Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 2nd ed. (London: Duckworth, 1985), pp. 9, 17, and 19. Seasoned participants in academic conferences and learned seminars realize the intensity of involvement in what Sheila Ruth has called “The Hunt.”Sheila Ruth, “Methodocracy, Misogyny, and Bad Faith,” Men's Studies Modified, Dale Spender (ed.) (Oxford: Pergamon, 1981), p. 48. The speaker is the quarry. The others, the auditors are the hunters. Some are accomplished, others are not yet blooded. They wait for the weak point. It's blood. They attack. The inexperienced hunters are enthusiastic. The seasoned hunters take their time. The quarry defends. An arbitrary time limit ends the combat, and after tea it is someone else's turn. Can anyone say that this is the best way to search out alternatives, weigh experience, assess implications, evaluate assertions? My title “The Government of Reason” is deliberately ambiguous. On the one hand it might mean governing according to the light of reason. This was, of course, the avowed aim of the Enlightenment. The conduct of political life would follow the bright line of reason. On the other hand, the title could mean governing reason, taking control of reason and using it as a weapon. Here we may be forgiven for thinking of Michel Foucault on the use of knowledge as power. The ambiguity of the title is meant to reflect the ambiguity of reality where both alternatives have occurred. Only half of the moral realm has been made the subject of political theory. (shrink)